U.S. Blurs Fact With Fiction In Yemen

Instead of holding Ali Abdullah Saleh internationally accountable as the strongman openly defies the UN/GCC-led "transition" process, the Obama administration has organized another information campaign to muffle Saleh's commotion and defend U.S. policy in Yemen. The latest strike was just transmitted through The Los Angeles Times, but it seems to have missed its mark again. The report's misleading main body ends with a refutation of U.S. counterterrorism and illustrates how far the administration is willing to exaggerate in order to conceal a foreign policy meltdown.

Washington's Definition of "Lull"

General James Mattis isn't the first individual to make such a claim, but he may be the most powerful. CENTCOM's new chief inherited David Petraeus's transactional relationship with Saleh when he took command in August 2010, and he now oversees Special Forces and CIA coordination on the Arabian Peninsula. The Times' journalists fall into the administration's trap when they write, "The U.S. effort in Yemen was brought to a virtual standstill — a 'lull,' Gen. James N. Mattis told Congress — by Saleh's yearlong effort to cling to power." The Wall Street Journal provided an accurate assessment when reporting on Mattis's early-March testimony, clarifying that "he said there had been a 'lull' in some U.S. programs, but they hadn't stopped all U.S. operations."

"The U.S. military suspended training activities in Yemen last year due to political instability," said Army Lt. Col. Jim Gregory, a Pentagon spokesman. "However, given Yemen's critical needs, we are exploring the possibility of resuming our suspended military assistance to help Yemen confront the common threat of al Qaeda."

As the WSJ points out, the CIA has expanded its operations since Yemen's revolution caught fire in January 2011. The number of drone strikes spiked in May and June, when Saleh first left the country for medical aid, and have continued throughout the "transitional" process that began in November. This strategy is designed to wow American voters, who generally demand a cheap, far-off war against al-Qaeda, and create distance between Saleh's corrupt and murderous regime.

Whether U.S. training operations were truly suspended at any point is difficult to conclude; State and Pentagon officials have given contradictory statements on the issue. However the manufactured divide between programs is superficial. Saleh's U.S.-trained Republican Guard and Central Security Organization spearheaded his assaults against Yemen's revolutionaries, at times using U.S. weapons to kill protesters. Pentagon officials insist that no equipment bled over into the streets, but WikiLeaks revealed Saleh's misappropriations against the north Houthis and Southern Movement before the revolution.

Training and arming his personal guard, then suspending operations during a year of carnage, is an absurd alibi.

Despite a bloody crackdown that killed hundreds of peaceful protesters, Saleh has kept himself useful by intermittently cooperating on the intelligence front, in turn producing the death of public enemy Anwar al-Awlaki. As a direct consequence of Saleh's notoriously duplicitous behavior (exposed by WikiLeaks, among other sources), Washington also assists with the logistics and supplying of Yemen's army as it battles al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in the south. Residents of Abyan governorate and one of Saleh's own generals accused his counterterrorism units of withdrawing for months, a reality later confirmed by John Brennan himself. The White House's counterterrorism chief has assumed diplomatic duties in a politically volatile environment, to many Yemenis' displeasure, and Brennan subsequently claimed that Saleh's cooperation had since improved by the time of al-Alwaki's death. After AQAP overran Rada'a, located southeast of Sana'a, with suspicious ease in January 2012, Yemeni officials reported that U.S. Special Forces were participating in the recovery operation.

These developments have created a vicious cycle of instability that is currently drowning out Yemen's revolutionaries. Disturbingly, the Obama administration wants to get every program back online and, more importantly, boosted to higher levels before the revolution achieves its objectives. Washington continues to entertain the payoff of a smaller war, but Yemen's battleground will only expand under the current U.S. policy.

"Not supporting Saleh"

According to named and unnamed officials, training operations with Saleh's regime were suspended once the administration became fearful of the safety of U.S. personnel. This notion jars with Washington's eagerness to "restart" counterterrorism training by deploying personnel already sleeping inside the country. More flagrantly false, though, is the White House's claim that America "isn't backing a repressive ruler." The administration had grown unsustainably close to Saleh's personal "counterterrorism" units, more often deployed against the Houthis and Southern Movement than AQAP. The administration did support the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) prior to the revolution, when Saleh attempted to stretch his five-year term to seven, but Washington simply hoped to run a counterterrorism campaign under Saleh through 2014.

A billion dollar aid package was earmarked to sustain him until then. From here his son, Ahmed, or another pro-American official (possibly Hadi) would assume nominal control of the presidency as Saleh worked from the background.

Yemen's revolution essentially accelerated this plan; Western and Gulf powers still intend to guide Yemen down a controlled path of political, military and economic hegemony. Saleh himself received a medical vacation in New York City before returning to Sana'a, where he receives preferential treatment under the guise that he must be removed slowly. Hollow threats to freeze his assets or evoke his UN-approved immunity are nowhere close to materializing (because some of his assets and potential warcrimes trace back to Washington). Yet this narrative has been successfully built up stateside as the U.S. and GCC attempt to restructure Yemen's military, an urgent process that subverts a genuine political transition.

A majority of Yemenis already perceive the U.S. as of Saleh's only allies, and efforts to manipulate the revolution continue to expand the country's pre-existing antagonism towards America.

"Not interfering with internal conflicts"

The Obama administration would like Americans and Yemenis to be believe, in one official's words, "We don't want to become involved in the country's internal battles." Unfortunately the administration has accelerated far past this point of return. Turning "every antigovernment fighter against the United States" could be an exaggeration, but Washington has made enemies with every anti-regime bloc outside of the JMP. From the Houthis in the north to Yemen's urbanized revolution to the south's secessionist campaign, each area is negatively affected by U.S. and Saudi policy.

Pentagon officials counter these fatal flaws by raising the profile of Abd Mansur Hadi, Saleh's replacement and former vice president. The less egoistical Hadi represents an upgrade from Saleh's autocratic personality and, if left to his own decisions, could serve as a passable transitionary figure. A senior Defense official told the LA Times that Hadi "has shown the will and ability to make the changes... It's a matter of getting the right focus and the right plan and someone to lead it." However Washington and the GCC didn't author "the right plan" to resolve Yemen's multidimensional conflict - they wrote with their own interests in mind. Saleh kept Hadi around for a reason and the new president has found himself predictably obstructed by loyalists - all a byproduct of the GCC's terms.

Although cautiously accepted by the revolutionaries as the lesser of two evils, Hadi is viewed as a puppet by Saleh and Washington alike.

The country's geopolitical significance partially explains the relentless nature of counterrevolutionary forces. What accounts for the mystery is the fact that America's pre-revolutionary policy would create a more dangerous AQAP by 2014. The revolution should have triggered a strategic realignment that emphasizes relations with Yemenis, not sacrifices them to maintain counterterrorism operations with the remnants of Saleh's regime. Until the full spectrum of Yemen's popular grievances are addressed by an objective party, U.S. policy will remain a source of instability with limited sustainability in Yemen's future.